ma/or elements are. however, missing from the economic argument. One is some awareness of the political as well as economic importance of having an international o,'der o,' 'ni/es of the game'... Second there are moral as well as economic and political considerations... If there is a case for the British Government to be moi'e involved in alleviating their poverty it i's in the fï,ct instance a mo, 'al one Vincent Cable3 This friilure to understand the enormous economic potential of less wealthy developing countries both as markets and as suppliers is compounded by two further misconceptions. The fIrst is to see existing international economic and fïnancial al-rangements as essential/v health r and adequate... The next misconception is to pin the blame for the world's economic malaise on OPEC.. .
Edward Heath4
Kicked into Obscurity? In the United Kingdom at least the question is no longer whether the Brandt Report's proposals constitute an adequate and appropriate programme for survival: it is whether they will survive as a serious focus for political debate and action. At the moment, Programme for Su,'vival seems well on the way to joining its 62 Bulletin, 1981 . vol 12 no2. Institute of Development Studies. Sussex phenomenally ineffective and ill-timed predecessor Pa,'tners in Development (Pearson Report) in the obscurity of academic stacks and footnotes.
Why has this happened? On the face of it the Brandt Report had several marks in its favour. lt was a unanimous report of a number of statesmen and thinkers from major First and Third World countries, which had both a clear message and a technically (and conceivably politically) practicable programme. That programme was a blend of radical reformist capitalism (on the production side) and quasi-egalitarian social democracy (on the distribution and regulation side)a blend that, on the face of it, has potential appeal to both major British parties. Further, the Report uses a 'mutual interest' economic case for the rules of the game, and it argues for the reform of the international economic order to augment (not supplant) the moral case for the eradication of absolute poverty.
Further, the Brandt Report is the only systematic programme for global economic restructuring now on the political market with any real chance of acceptance.
There is no serious conservative northern alternative.
The radical southern alternatives may be coherent and intellectually plausible, but on the one hand they cannot be expected to be achieved without compromise and on the other they tend to assume that the Old International Economic Order works well for industrial economies, ignoring the fact that it has been overtaken by the New International Economic Disorder. Indeed, as a policy document and guide to action it rates rather well.
Ideological Resistance
Yet it is in a related area that we find the root of the hostility and inaction. A variant of this critique derives from the current IMF analysis's which gives priority to the control of inflation, specifically to restoring the balance between supply and demand by cutting the latter (especially by reducing real wages), not raising the former. However, the IMF is concerned about the cost-push effects of undercapacity operation, and actually favours both recycling! transfer of international liquidity and energy price/ production management approaches which are compatible with the Brandt proposals. Nevertheless, in its stress on money supply growth, demand pull and institutional structures (labour, business practices, state spending) as primary causes of inflation it does agree with the monetarists that renewed growth to bring output up (thus equalising demand) and reducing cost push inflation by spreading costs (higher productivity) are unattainable. The concessional finance proposals of £8,000 mn globally might imply £300-400 mn gross for UK, less 'clawback' through reduced unemployment costs and additional tax revenue on production, wages, prof its.24 This is not a negligible sum, neither is it a huge one in the context of the UK budget.
If the 'muddling through' argument is taken to mean a need to keep different cases for international change separate, and recognise that in practice there are wide variations in their force, complementarity and exact nature, it is correct. But it is not evident that the mutual interest and ethical arguments are normally contradictoty. For example, increasing Third World food shortages have negative implications for UK exports and for UK domestic food prices. They also raise ethical imperatives linked to malnutrition and starvation. Are the two lines of argument inherently contradictory? Is it impossible (or immoral) to use both to construct a case stronger than either of its two
The 'inevitable decline' opposition to Brandt is of course part of a much broader outlook. Is that outlook necessarily correct? (Of course, so long as it is acted on it is probably self fulfilling.) Does concentrating on limiting and delaying change rather than seeking to adjust to or capitalise on it actually reduce or increase the costs of (benefits from) change? Why has the UK had greater transitional and adjustment problems than other 'mature industrial economies', eg, Netherlands, Belgium? Is there really anything inevitable about the causes?
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Where and What Now? the substantial proportion (about 30 per cent) of British exports sold to developing countries implies that a significant fall in their growth rates or import capacity could worsen Britain's export and manufacturing sector problems; projecting present balance of payments trends for Third World economies (excluding major oil exporters) leads inexorably to the conclusion that they will be forced to cut imports and growth unless a structural increase in exports to industrial economies and/or alterations to facilitate increased (or even sustained) resource transfers (commercial and/or concessional) can be achieved.
These do seem to imply a British interest in promoting action at the structural level in the international economic system and in particular, its North-South aspect,27 and a need for concerted action through a number of instruments in a number of sectors. If that conclusion is correct, inaction or marginal responses to disorders and crises are likely to prove a very poor second best.
At the present time the only coherent strategic package of proposals which has even potential 'political saleability' at international level is Programme for Survival. Its opponents have not, to date, produced a comparable monetarist (or other) alternative strategy to grapple with the North-South aspects of the new international economic disorder. This is intellectually and, more important, practically, not a satisfactory situation.
It is of course not novelthe whole NIEO debate from the early 1970s on has been characterised by the tabling of a series of south strategy/programme package proposals and a corresponding series of attempts at 'honest brokerage' or 'negotiated compromise' also take into account technical, practical, political and north interest limitations. On the North side-particularly in the UK-the response has been to debate, delay, raise technical queries and objections and agree to marginal action-but neither to accept major structural changes nor to make substantial counter-proposals. This is a satisfactory approach only if present trends are acceptable to the UK and are consistent with international economic stability. Neither of these conditions appears to be the case.
What Might be Done?
The implications for those who support and those who oppose the Programme for Survival are rather different.
For the proponents there is a need to consider the nature of the opposition and its arguments as a first step in deciding whether to try and convince significant economic and political groups that Programme for Survival should be acted upon, or to push for a tactically modified package,2' or to redraft,29 and how these things should be done.
The opponents have a somewhat different obligation, namely, to produce an alternative strategy or programme for the resolution of the intensifying international economic disorder and to make out a coherent case for their ability to succeed. One such case might be monetarist-none has yet been produced in enough detail to qualify as a proposal for the structural reform of the international economic system. Another might be centred on a massive expansion of TNC activity in the south. A third could be a demonstration that, contrary to the 1970-81 record and almost all present projections, the Old International Economic Order remains basically viable and dynamic, so that 'steady as you go' policies are adequate and appropriate.
Programme for Survival's own survival as a focus for debate is very much in doubt, and if its opponents do not offer any alternatives this could be the worst outcome. Proponents of the Brandt Report should examine the nature of the opposition to it more carefully, and seek to counter it or to modify the aspects of the programme which are objected to. The opponents, for their part, should put forward their own preferred courses of action to allow for real debate and choice among alternative positive options. In 'The Controversial Economics of the Brandt Report', reproduced in this Bulletin. cf Cable, op cit. pp 24-25. For the author's views see 'A chance to make sense out of economic chaos'. op cit and 'Gale warnings: fragments of charts and guides for navigators'. Development Dialogue, no 1. 1980. Presumably no reader will endorse all of these. It is true that under conditions of uncertainty some decisions will be perceived as having been wrong by any individual, interest or sub-class. cf T. Higgins, 'Whatever happened to Monetarism?', Guardian, 26 January 1981, p7.
The IMF analysis, loe cit, demonstrates this at least as forcefully as Programme for Survival, even if from a quite different economic world view. The British Leyland grant of £1,000 mn over two years has been justified on the basis that tax losses and unemployment costs to government would be larger. This is not to imply that general North-North or NorthwestNortheast (socialist Europe) issues are less important. However, they fall outside the scope of this essay and are peripheral to the Brandt Report debate.
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Some opponents, cg Henderson (see this Bulletin) suggest that a substantial proportion of the basic initial programme might have broader support and less opposition if separated from the analysis and medium term programme. This approach has risks, but arguably would produce a forward momentum and allow subsequent changes to be agreed in a less unsatisfactory and uncertain context. Either because they are convinced the Brandt Report is, after all, unsound or because they are convinced there is no chance of achieving substantial implementation of its proposals.
Ironically the most coherent monetarist model albeit one significantly divergent from those of the IMFaddressed to these issues has been presented by a member of the Brandt Commission secretariat: J. F.
Rweyemamu's 'Restructuring the international monetary system', Development Dialogue, no 2, 1980. However, that model is advanced as complementary to (or in elaboration of) Programme for SurvivaL
